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Abstract  
This article uses insights from cognitive psychology to contrast judge-made 
law with legislative and executive policymaking. I argue that the 
predominant narrow conceptions of reason and rationality have led to 
overly optimistic views of deliberate policymaking at the expense of 
traditional judge-made law. However, alternative views of what constitutes 
rationality suggest that judge-made law may have some often overlooked 
advantages over deliberate policymaking.  
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I. Introduction 
The literature on the putative economic advantages of common law 
over civil law is substantial. A number of authors have argued that 
the institutional advantages of common law stem from the different 
structures of government that are characteristic of different legal 
frameworks. The main source of the superior economic performance 
of common law systems, in this view, is the greater independence 
that common law judges enjoy (Hayek 1960; Merryman 1996; Glaeser 
and Shleifer 2002; Klerman and Mahoney 2007). While both 
common law and civil law judges may enjoy nominal independence 
from government in terms of security of appointment and salary, 
common law judges also have substantial behavioral independence 
associated with their lawmaking power. The weaker judicial 
protection in civil law countries translates into, on average, more 
interventionist government, more bureaucracy, heavier regulation, 
and less secure property rights—and, therefore, inferior economic 
performance.  
A different kind of argument in favor of common law points to 
the nature of the law itself, and in particular the adaptability of 
common law on the one hand and the rigidity of civil law on the 
other. Posner (1973) makes the case for common law by arguing that 
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judges have a preference for efficiency. A precursor of this view is 
Coase (1960), who observed that in the absence of other criteria, 
common law judges are inclined to use economic efficiency as a 
criterion in dispute resolution. Similarly, Rubin (1977), Priest (1977), 
and Goodman (1978) argue that inefficient rules are more likely to be 
litigated than efficient ones are, which pushes common law in the 
direction of higher efficiency (see Zywicki and Stringham 2010 for a 
survey).  
Despite all its alleged superiority, common law has been in retreat 
ever since the Enlightenment era. Not only has codified civil law 
spread over continental Europe, but in the remaining common law 
countries, case law has gradually yielded to statutory legislation. Rules 
created at the executive and legislative levels have become more 
substantial and more elaborate, while courts, at least when it comes 
to economic rules and institutions, have become more deferent to the 
other two branches of government.  
In this article, I maintain that the intellectual background of the 
growth of statutory law is the rise of rationality’s normative status. 
The elevated status of reason and rationality has consistently extolled 
deliberate policymaking at the expense of traditional judge-made law. 
I argue that the uncritical acceptance of the rationalistic attitude may 
not have left us better off in the institutional and policymaking sense. 
In particular, certain recent contributions from cognitive psychology 
call into question some widely accepted ideas about what constitutes 
rational policymaking. From this alternative cognitive standpoint, I 
will challenge the view that deliberate policymaking yields superior 
outcomes compared to decentralized judge-made rulings based on 
general constitutional principles.  
 
II. Limited Knowledge in the Complex Economy 
It is generally recognized that rule design in representative 
government is burdened with many incentive-related problems. 
Public choice scholars warned that rational maximization of political 
agents brings about regulatory distortions and inefficient rules 
(Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Olson 1965; Tullock 1967). Legal 
authors have also recognized difficulties with voters’ representation 
that make legislation and the regulatory bureaucracy poor 
representatives of public preferences. Several of them have pointed 
out specifically that judiciary rulemaking has the capacity to alleviate 
these difficulties: Bruno Leoni’s (1961) argument in favor of judge-
made law is partly based on the claim that legislation does not 
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properly represent people’s interests, and Richard Epstein (1985) sees 
rent-seeking as a reason why judicial review in the property-taking 
area should be substantive. 
An alternative and less common view is that the main source of 
legislative and other regulatory error lies not in bad intentions or even 
in the self-interest of policymakers, but in the inherent 
unintelligibility of the market economy. A market economy is a nexus 
of a large number of causes and consequences that we are not able to 
entirely recognize and comprehend. The nature of economic 
complexity is such that no amount of economic, legal, or regulatory 
expertise may suffice to recognize all relevant causal relationships. 
Economic behavior is far too multifaceted for us to be able to design 
rules that will steer it in a predictable and desired direction, even if 
efforts are both well intentioned and well informed. Bounded 
rationally and the limited knowledge of policymakers hinder the 
optimism about the possibility of competent public policy.  
Although often neglected, the argument about the complexity of 
economic order and the limits of our cognitive abilities to capture it 
has been present for a long time. Philosophers in the tradition of the 
Scottish Enlightenment, as well as some representatives of early 
conservatism and romanticism, understood very well the intricacy of 
not only the market but all social relationships. They argued that 
social order is far too complicated to be fully comprehended by 
reason, and they repeatedly pointed out that the market economy’s 
success was not the result of a conscious design but rather came 
about spontaneously through decentralized human action. Rules of 
conduct in the social and market order developed gradually in the 
process of coordinating different individuals’ interests, plans, and 
actions. We may try to institute some radically different rules of 
conduct, based on our understanding of the existing order, but that 
would be a sign of hubris. Our knowledge and understanding of the 
world are inferior to the knowledge accumulated in the long-
surviving institutions. Instead of reason alone, we must therefore rely 
on experience, tradition, and some universal traits of human nature.  
In the present, literature on the limits of policymaking in the 
presence of political ignorance among voters has built on this 
tradition. Caplan (2007) argues that economic policymaking fails due 
to several voter biases. Voters’ policy preferences differ from those 
of professional economists and are typically biased toward more 
government intervention in the economy. Literature on many 
particular cases of government failure has also pointed to the 
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problems of either voters’ or policymakers’ relative ignorance in 
comparison to the enormous complexity of problems they are trying 
to solve (Friedman and Kraus 2011; Somin 2013; Lucas 2014; 
Friedman forthcoming).  
Still, both economic theory and practical public policy today are 
dominated by the explicit or more often implicit presumption of the 
possibility of rational and well-informed policymaking. For example, 
consider a statement by a leading political economist: “Unlike the 
generalist judges, regulators also tend to be specialized, and are 
expected to understand more. . . . Specialization of the regulators is 
the central efficiency argument in their favor, particularly in the areas, 
such as finance and environment, where the issues are enormously 
complex” (Shleifer 2010, p. 18).  
Shleifer’s analysis of regulation lacks any concern that the 
regulatory design might suffer from a lack of knowledge. Shleifer 
(2010) argues that regulation exists because it is an efficient solution 
in cases where the court system fails to resolve contract and tort 
disputes—and by making this claim, he effectively assumes away the 
possibility of a faulty, biased, insufficiently informed regulation. 
While the issues are “enormously complex” (Shleifer 2010, p. 18), 
they are apparently not too complex for the competent and 
specialized regulator. In a separate discussion, Shleifer (2005) 
specifically analyzes possible inefficiencies that may arise from 
imperfect regulation, pointing to the standard public choice and 
interest group arguments, as well as to the history of colonial 
transplantation of institutions that might be less than perfectly 
suitable for local conditions. He once again does not even consider 
the possibility of regulatory error as a potential cause of inefficiency. 
Whereas Shleifer uses interest group arguments to challenge the 
assumption of government benevolence, he nevertheless tacitly 
assumes regulatory omniscience. 
It has been typical in standard economics and political economy 
to presume boundless rationality on the part of policymakers. The 
recent advance of behavioral economics has changed little in this 
regard. For one, behavioral economists typically disregard that the 
regulators within executive and legislative branches, who are 
supposed to correct markets’ behavior, may themselves be prone to 
cognitive limits and biases. Moreover, behavioral economics is, at its 
core, a rationalistic enterprise. It is focused on marginally improving 
human behavior so that real-world decision makers better fit the 
external standards of rationality. Aimed at making people more 
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rational, it does not come close to the issue of our fundamental 
incapacity to comprehend and control the world in all its opacity. If 
anything, it is engaged in the opposite direction—toward the greater 
influence of knowledgeable and scientifically informed experts in 
society and the economy. In the words of a leading proponent of 
behavioral economics, “The executive is the most knowledgeable 
branch,” which is why it should be given “considerable discretion in 
both domestic and foreign affairs” (Sunstein forthcoming). 
The cognitive psychology standpoint opposed to rationality in the 
current predominant sense of the term is that of ecological rationality 
(Cosmides and Tooby 1994, Gigerenzer 2000, 2008; Smith 2003). 
Gigerenzer (2000) employs the concept of ecological rationality to 
account for the use of crude heuristics as an optimal cognitive 
strategy. Ecological rationality does not mean that each individual 
decision is rational, but rather that adopting a certain mode of 
behavior maximizes our returns over the long run. Any given 
heuristic is not better than a perfectly rational deliberation; however, 
the use of heuristics as a mode of behavior, given time and 
knowledge constraints, on the whole may trump rational cost-benefit 
analysis as a basis for decision-making. 
The idea behind ecological rationality is that after a problem’s 
difficulty reaches a certain level, ordinary rationality ceases to be the 
optimal tool for resolving the problem. That is why in everyday life, 
when confronted with problems that exceed our cognitive capacities, 
we use heuristics as cognitive shortcuts. Heuristics are cognitive tools 
that abstract from a large amount of noncrucial information and 
focus on only a few important elements.1 We solve cognitive 
problems that require an enormous amount of information and 
analysis with the use of a few simple rules. In many ordinary 
situations, a rational cost-benefit analysis would be a failure, and we 
behave optimally when we rely on heuristics instead.  
For example, we often quickly buy a product whose brand name 
we recognize, rather than trying to learn everything about the product 
and its alternatives. By choosing according to the brand name, not 
only do we save time and effort, but given our necessary ignorance of 
                                                          
1 Under the influence of the research program led by Daniel Kahneman and Amos 
Tversky (see, generally, Kahneman 2011), the term “heuristic” is often used with a 
negative connotation and it is argued that relying on heuristics rather than fully 
informed rational deliberation leads to suboptimal (“irrational”) decisions. In this 
article, I follow Gigerenzer’s (2000, 2008) treatment of heuristics as usually helpful 
cognitive shortcuts. 
48 S. Tasic / The Journal of Private Enterprise 31(4), 2016, 43–63 
all possible costs and benefits involved, following this simple 
heuristic may paradoxically yield a better decision than a deliberate 
choice based on our calculated costs and benefits. Similarly, we often 
use moral heuristics, our internal vague feelings of right or wrong, to 
give us some sense of direction. Voters, for instance,  are interested 
in politicians’ personal lives. While their past personal behavior is not 
a perfect predictor of their future policies, we are inclined to think 
that a person who is honorable in their private life will also try to 
serve the public virtuously. Heuristics are, therefore, double-edged 
swords: economizing on information, they may miss something 
important from time to time and lead us to a wrong answer. 
However, given our limited cognitive abilities and, therefore, our 
radical ignorance in front of complex issues with a number of 
unknown unknowns, the use of heuristics in such cases is a long-run 
rational strategy.  
Seen in the institutional context, the concept of ecological 
rationality is analogous to the earlier concept of rule utilitarianism. In 
both classic and modern accounts, rule rationality is broadly defined 
as maximization over rules rather than acts (Mill 1863, Harsanyi 1977, 
Aumann 2008). Rather than optimizing every individual act, people 
may optimize the rules, or modes of behavior, that are aimed at 
maximizing expected utility over a large number of acts in different 
situations. 
In this framework, institutions that have evolved in the market 
economy tend to be rational on the level of rules, even though 
various exceptions and aberrations may well be rational if seen as 
isolated acts. For example, a bailout of an individual troubled bank 
may easily have a net positive welfare effect. Introduction of the 
practice of bank bailouts, however, would probably be inferior as a 
rule. An omniscient and benevolent government, aware of all the 
present and future costs and benefits of any given bailout, could in 
principle cherry-pick which banks are worth saving and which are 
not. But since omniscience on this issue is not an option, a 
government that has a longstanding “no bailouts” rule is taking an 
ecologically rational stance. A realistic view of our limited abilities to 
comprehend all the present and future costs and benefits, even 
leaving the question of government benevolence aside, entails 
reliance on general rules rather than on individual decisions.  
Any argument in favor of following general rules as opposed to 
elaborate policymaking may be, broadly speaking, placed in the 
Hayekian tradition. Hayek’s original argument in favor of general 
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rules and the common law rests on the evolution of rules, along with 
their survival, as evidence of their merit (Hayek 1960, 1973). Another 
well-known justification of general and simple rules comes from 
Epstein (1997). While also broadly within the same tradition, 
Epstein’s argument for the most part relies on a sober cost-benefit 
analysis.  
In what follows, this paper attempts to supplement such claims 
by invoking additional support from contemporary cognitive 
psychology, in particular from the evolutionary approach to 
reasoning and the findings about the constructive role of heuristics. 
The paper arrives at conclusions similar to those that that Hayek and 
Epstein, among others, have reached. The argument here, however, 
relies neither on the evolution of rules nor on the cost-benefit 
analysis of various rules, but rather on the comparison of competing 
concepts of rationality present in cognitive psychology today. 
Addressing the choice between judiciary rules and policy discretion 
from the viewpoint of limited rationality gives credence to the claim 
that the additional epistemological quality of judiciary decisions 
comes from their de facto role of fast and frugal heuristics. 
 
III. Law As Heuristic 
The emergence of statutory law in the nineteenth century was initially 
justified with the certainty and clarity of rules that the introduction of 
legal codification would bring. The codification movement signified a 
victory of the ideal of rationality and gained many proponents among 
liberal intellectuals. Instead of the previous chaotic, decentralized, 
and asymmetric common law rules, the new nation-states could now 
create well-designed systems of unified and coherent rules (see, e.g., 
Bentham 1822). During the twentieth century, the justification of 
statutory law gradually shifted from clarity, predictability, and 
rationality to democracy and the will of the electorate—but the 
possibility of rational and informed policymaking remained a widely 
accepted rationale for the rise of statutory law.  
At the same time, growing evidence from cognitive psychology 
suggests that we tend to underestimate the complexity of certain 
phenomena and feel overconfident about our ability to understand 
and resolve complex issues (Tasic 2009). Attempts to consciously 
shape society through legislation are likely to fall under this general 
tendency. Not only is the market economy a complex order, but on 
the surface, it appears simpler than it really is. Its underlying 
complexity is why we are often surprised when attempts to direct the 
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market order toward a goal are in vain, or result in unintended 
consequences that could not have been predicted beforehand, easily 
or at all. In a survey of academic literature appraising different sorts 
of regulation, Winston (2006) reports an overwhelming failure of 
real-world regulation to achieve desired results. That calls for 
regulation continue in spite of widely reported failure indicates 
unwarranted optimism among voters and experts alike about the 
availability of knowledge and human abilities to direct a complex 
market economy toward desired outcomes. 
The role that heuristics play in individual cognition is in social 
cognition played by the elementary rule of legal norms and principles. 
Evolved in societies that came to have an evolutionary advantage 
over alternative forms of organization, institutions such as property 
rights and voluntary contracting are efficient as rules of conduct—
even if occasional policy deviations from them could be rational if 
viewed as isolated, individual acts. In the cognitive framework based 
on ecological rationality, the judiciary branch oriented toward general 
rules has an epistemological advantage over specialized agencies 
focused on outcomes.  
Common law judges are not experts on economic policy, growth, 
or development, and with minor exceptions, judges practice general 
law rather than any specialty. As Justice Breyer of the US Supreme 
Court explains: “We do not try to develop different areas of expertise 
over time. We are generalists. . . . Thus, any deference we may show 
to our other colleagues’ expert knowledge is limited” (Breyer 2004, p. 
3). From the ecological rationality paradigm, it is precisely the 
generality of judges that makes their institutional design superior—
contrary to Shleifer’s (2010) and Sunstein’s (forthcoming) 
aforementioned view that the specialization of regulators is the 
central efficiency argument in their favor. What makes judicial 
influence in institutional design efficient in the long run is not judges’ 
policy competence but the fact that their decisions are based on 
general principles that support a liberal constitutional order. The key 
to building an environment conducive to economic growth lies not in 
deliberate growth-enhancing policies but in the rules that emerge by 
adherence to certain longstanding principles.  
Notwithstanding the occasional highly visible excesses of judicial 
behavior, as well as the changes coming from the growing constraints 
imposed on courts by the mounting statutory legislation, judicial 
decision-making still rests on the principles that safeguard its distinct 
role in institutional design. Unlike statutory law, which exists 
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primarily for the implementation of goals set by parliaments, judge-
made law is largely passive and nondeliberate when it comes to the 
accomplishment of broader social goals. It works by reacting to the 
individual claims and creates rules only as a byproduct of regular 
judicial decisions. 
Naturally, judges’ ideological preferences and policy opinions will 
play some role in institutional design. But the importance of this fact 
is smaller than it might appear. In legal scholar Roscoe Pound’s 
(1923) classic account, judicial decision-making is a triangle of legal 
doctrines, rules, and standards; of the techniques of reasoning 
methods for the application of these standards; and finally, of their 
individual social, ethical, or policy views. The first two factors in 
decision-making are largely external for judges. They are accumulated 
in the legal system and in the broader institutional order. Judges must 
explain their opinions, and this practice ensures that their decisions 
satisfy some standards of reasoning and have some anchor in 
constitutional provisions and the rest of relevant law. The reliance on 
these more or less permanent doctrines and unified techniques is 
what makes the judiciary, in a typical case, more politically restrained 
in either direction than other branches. The space for exertion of 
personal policy views is much smaller for judges than is the case with 
members of the other two, purely political branches (see also Epstein 
and George 1992; Segal 2008). 
Even insofar as this space for personal preferences is open, 
judicial choices are based on relatively well-motivated individual 
decision-making, where career prospects and the avoidance of having 
a decision overturned serve as background incentives. As Posner 
(2008) points out, self-selection of judges should not be 
underestimated. The self-selection process indicates that those who 
decide to pursue judicial careers most likely share the goal of 
becoming, first of all, good judges. That also means that they are 
unlikely to have ardent ideological agendas, and certainly less so in 
comparison with professional politicians in the legislative and 
executive branches. If Posner’s conjecture is correct, then even 
within the zone of freedom from the established doctrines that they 
have, judges will, on average, be more likely to think in terms of 
certain fundamental principles and make their decisions accordingly.  
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IV. Limits of Expertise 
An objection to the argument for the cognitive contribution of judge-
made law by way of heuristic could be that even if we take it for 
granted that, in general, heuristics may be smarter than carefully 
reasoned and calculated decisions, the same does not necessarily 
apply to economic decision-making on the macro level. However, it 
is uncertain on which side the burden of proof should lie in this 
tentative dispute. As pointed out earlier, economics and policy 
analysis operate with the implicit presumption of expert and 
regulatory knowledge, but this presumption is unwarranted, especially 
in light of the argument that the enormous complexity of the market 
order tends to be underestimated.  
Meanwhile, there is no lack of evidence that our expert economic 
knowledge does not do well in comparison to some time-tested 
principles. Today, there is broad agreement about some common 
past mistakes even in some of the most basic questions of 
economics. To begin with, economists have long been led astray in 
the search for the policies that best promote economic prosperity. In 
just over half a century, economic growth was first seen as a question 
of the right combination of physical inputs such as labor, technology, 
and capital or its derivatives—investments and savings; with the rise 
of macroeconomics, economists have focused on managing 
macroeconomic aggregates, and the central task of experts has 
become finding the right aggregate magnitudes that would increase 
the national economy’s performance. Other influential schools of 
thought pointed to the necessity of extensive industrial planning for 
achieving higher growth rates; most egregiously, top Western 
economists considered central economic planning a respectable 
policy until the very collapse of communism (see, e.g., Bergson et al. 
1966). 
At the same time, institutions such as legal rules, contracts, and 
property rights have been largely disregarded in academia. A great 
number of professional economists simply did not perceive that 
private ownership is in any substantive way different than collective 
ownership, or that an institutional order that allows for greater 
freedom of contracts and credibly guarantees their enforcement is 
itself a major source of economic prosperity. Economists largely 
failed to recognize that prosperity, on a level beyond macroeconomic 
management, depends on the protection of private property rights 
and the predictable rules that guarantee maximum freedom of action. 
Meanwhile, it was moral values and simple constitutional heuristics 
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that provided the basis for the protection of private property and 
freedom of contract—not the economists’ and policymakers’ explicit 
theoretical awareness of the economic utility of these institutions. 
Accordingly, the role of judges in setting the rules and shaping 
institutions is not that of intentional policy expertise. 
Notwithstanding the increasing influence of the judicial policy 
analysis within the law and economics movement, policymaking is 
not what judges are or should be doing. The argument in favor of 
judge-made rules is not that judges are more competent, informed, or 
benevolent than regulators and policymakers, but rather that the 
decision-making functions of the judiciary differ from those of the 
legislative and executive branches. In fact, a potential peril in judicial 
lawmaking is precisely in the occasional proclivity of judges to act as 
experts and behave as if they were a policy-minded legislature. If 
judges consciously attempted to legislate in order to advance specific 
economic goals, they would fall into the same trap that the legislators 
and policymakers are already in. It is not the economic knowledge of 
judges that makes judge-made rules rational in the broader ecological 
sense. Judge-made rules anchored in a liberal constitution and 
emerging from the power of judicial review are advantageous because 
economic prosperity is most compatible with individuals’ freedom to 
act in the market economy. The emergence of such rules implies not 
judges as experts, but judges who understand their mission as 
employing the basic principles of justice to decide on specific cases. 
Judicial rule-setting is ecologically rational only as long as judges base 
their decisions on simple principles, are aware of the limits of their 
own knowledge and understanding, and do not act overly ambitiously 
in a quest to consciously shape society according to whatever good 
intentions they might have.  
Historically, economic prosperity did not come after a set of well-
conceived policies established by judges, legislators, or any other 
source of authority, but was a rather unpredicted consequence of the 
political and social developments that resulted in the establishment of 
relatively secure property rights and the freedom of economic action. 
Prosperity-friendly institutions were, in fact, at their highest point 
when common law was the only law regulating private life and 
business, when government statutes were rare, and when judges did 
not think that they should be concerned with any general social goals. 
As Leoni (1961) puts it, law was initially about the rules of behavior, 
but then somewhere along the way it became about improving the 
world. The modern ideas of judges as policy experts are the 
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consequence of the same failure to realize the limits of our 
knowledge and reason that spurred the growth of statutory 
legislation. But the paradox is that the judges sticking to simple 
constitutional principles are unintentionally being more sophisticated 
economists than the judges trying to comprehend and predict all 
possible social consequences and tailor their decisions accordingly. 
The cognitive content of simple but time-tested rules, that is, the 
capacity of constitutional principles to act as heuristics, made judges 
who relied on them unwittingly more ecologically rational than their 
contemporary counterparts who double as policymakers. As Epstein 
(1996) points out, looking at some contemporary developments in 
countries such as the United States, most nineteenth-century 
common law judges that knew nothing about law and economics but 
understood their role as enforcers of the established rules and 
principles were more likely to create long-term-prosperity-friendly 
institutions than are today’s judges, who try to act like policymaking 
experts.  
 
V. Judges and Policymakers  
Judicial policymaking, whether by applying constitutional principles 
or by claiming expertise, is commonly seen as an unwelcome 
aberration of democracy. The practice of judicial review has been in 
intellectual retreat, and even the limited defense that exists in the 
literature concentrates on purely constitutional aspects, such as the 
role of the constitutional judiciary in the protection of rights and 
liberties and the preservation of the separation of powers (see, e.g., 
Bork 1990; Dworkin 1996; Kramer 2004; Waldron 2006). As 
democracy has come to be considered not only a venerable system of 
governance but also a method of achieving shared social goals, the 
view that a judiciary, which is both countermajoritarian and limiting 
of the elected or appointed policymakers, could in fact enhance the 
quality of public decision-making is not easily accepted. The existing 
defense of an opinionated judiciary has therefore focused on 
constitutional issues, somewhat conceding that the insistence on the 
doctrine might affect the practice of democracy, but claiming that the 
constitution, represented by a series of landmark decisions starting 
with Marbury v. Madison (1803), is a higher law that ought to be 
complied with. A complementary libertarian argument puts forward 
that the judiciary is the last resort for the protection of individual 
rights, which makes its mandate to oppose legislation justified 
(Barnett 2004).  
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In a broader sense, the possibility of the beneficial judicial 
influence on rule creation has not been overly appreciated, perhaps 
for the same reason that economists were led astray from realizing 
the importance of property rights and freedom of contract, focusing 
instead on alternative sets of preconceived policies. The trust in 
deliberate, rational, and informed policy design is at odds with the 
reliance on crude and general rules, and in particular, the power of 
judicial review may be seen as an active obstacle to growth-
promotion policies. However, once legislative, regulatory, and 
policymaking failure are allowed, it is conceivable that the judiciary 
could have a positive epistemic input if the rules it insists on are in 
line with the established principles conducive to growth and 
prosperity. The dilemma of institutional design may alternatively be 
described as a conflict between the collective wisdom in the present, 
expressed in policymaking, legislation, and regulation, and the 
accumulated wisdom of past generations, which is contained in some 
well-established principles acting as cognitive heuristics. As Hayek 
(1988) points out, some key constitutional principles have come 
about not as the result of human design, but as a result of human 
action in the long process of cultural evolution. Many of them we 
came to appreciate as moral values, but they survived also because of 
the beneficial consequences their application carried. Today, the legal 
and moral value of these institutions is as liberties or rights, but their 
parallel epistemic role is as heuristics, and their equivalent economic 
role is as being the essential conditions for economic growth. Hence 
the seeming coincidence that the principles of a liberal constitution 
are the very same principles that constitute sound economics, as seen 
by growth and development theories that have, after a long interlude, 
become fashionable again (see, e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). 
In the normative analysis of judicial impact on institutional 
design, a distinction can be made between the judiciary oriented on 
rights and rules in a nonconsequentialist way, and the judiciary that 
consciously attempts to advance social goals (Zywicki and Sanders 
2008). The first type of judge, who may be said to belong in the 
philosophical tradition of Hayek and Kant, sees his role as 
interpreting or creating rules based on certain principles and 
regardless of consequences. In the Hayekian view, a judge’s task is 
not to improve society by creating better legal rules, but merely to 
apply the principles of justice in general, and to do so while looking 
at the existing and established customs for guidance (Hayek 1960, 
1973; Posner 2005). Reason is an imperfect tool for deciding among 
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specific rules, and it is safer therefore for judges to stick to enforcing 
existing customs without being too concerned about the 
consequences because they are largely unknowable in any case. The 
second type, which may be placed within the legal philosophical 
tradition of Posner and, previously, Bentham, is in fact closer to the 
policymaker and deviates from the principle-based judicial behavior 
on which our argument for constitutional rules as heuristics relies. 
The epistemic case for judicial input in institutional design fails if 
judges purposefully engage in policy-driven constructivism.  
 
VI. Examples and Cases  
It is likely that the role that the original constitutional framework 
gave to the US judiciary is one reason why the United States by and 
large developed more market-friendly institutions than continental 
Europe did. Continental Europe was largely deprived of judicial 
influence by its tradition of civil law, parliamentarian sovereignty, and 
the more restricted practice of constitutional review in democracy. 
Legislative dominance in institutional design has resulted in the rules 
of the game being strongly influenced by the preferences of 
policymakers, presumably to a certain extent led by public opinion, 
but with a noticeable lack of principle-based constitutional input.  
The difference between the two approaches was historically larger 
than it is today, and it was the most salient when the changes toward 
a more deferent judiciary in common law countries were about to 
occur. In the United States, the substantive due process doctrine gave 
to freedom of economic action the equal treatment that other 
individual freedoms had. Lochner v. New York (1905) provides a good 
example as perhaps the most prominent case of the judiciary’s 
attempt to safeguard individual economic action from legislative 
intervention. In Lochner, the US Supreme Court invalidated a state law 
limiting the working hours of bakery workers on the grounds that 
under the Fifth Amendment’s “due process” clause, the law exceeded 
the state’s legitimate police powers and unduly interfered with the 
freedom of contract. It asserted that by limiting working hours, the 
legislature prevented workers and employers from entering mutually 
agreeable contracts and therefore struck down the act.  
Lochner was the highlight of the era of the relatively activist 
courts, which invalidated much of the progressive legislation. This 
legislation aimed at achieving what its proponents considered to 
represent economic and social progress, but the means it proposed 
typically involved attenuations of property rights and infringements 
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on freedom of contract and other voluntary economic action. Not 
only did the Supreme Court of the Lochner era not hesitate to use 
the power of judicial review to strike down legislative acts that 
collided with constitutional principles, but unlike any later court, it 
readily included freedom of contract in its conception of 
constitutionally protected individual liberties.2 From 1905 to the mid-
1930s, the Supreme Court invalidated approximately 200 economic 
regulations (Stone et al. 1996). Waldron (2006) counts 170 statutes 
pertaining only to labor that were struck down by state and federal 
courts during the 1880–1935 period. 
The term “Lochner era” is today commonly used to designate a 
disreputable period in Supreme Court history. But common for the 
critiques of these and other decisions of the era is that they are 
focusing solely on the court’s apparent intentions, with little or no 
regard for the practical consequences of the decisions. The decision 
in Lochner, as well as the entire Lochner-era court, is essentially 
criticized for obstructing some well-intentioned legislative initiatives. 
However, many economists would say today—or it so follows from 
standard microeconomics textbooks—that freedom of contract in 
the labor market in fact enabled more workers to gain employment in 
the open market and thus increased total welfare. By simply following 
the principle of freedom of contract, justices in Lochner unwittingly 
decided what sound economics would have told them to do. In view 
of the argument presented here, their decision was based not on the 
rational deliberation of causes and effects but on a constitutionally 
derived principle whose epistemic role was, regardless of the judicial 
argument or judges’ intentions, that of a fast and frugal heuristic. 
Furthermore, the simple judicial rule was, per standard 
microeconomics, better aligned with the long-term interests of the 
workers themselves than specifically intended labor legislation would 
have been.  
Other court decisions of the era included striking down entry 
restrictions, price limitations, or state-sponsored cartel agreements 
enacted by various states’ legislatures and the federal government. 
The rise of progressive ideas brought about the growth of legislation 
meant both to improve the economy according to some external 
criteria of efficiency and to structure society according to certain 
presumed ideals of justice. Besides labor laws and market entry 
                                                          
2 I set aside the issue of federal power versus state rights present in Lochner and 
related cases because my goal is to discuss the content of legislative as opposed to 
judicial decisions in the abstract and, at any level, not to justify particular outcomes.  
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restrictions, the newly minted antitrust laws were probably the most 
evident case of legislative intervention that hindered the development 
of entrepreneurship. However, courts—still operating on the old 
formalist principles of the nineteenth century—were able to 
counteract those tendencies for a considerable period. The relative 
preservation of economic freedoms was achieved by way of the 
judiciary invoking the fundamental principles of property and 
contract against what was generally thought of as rationally 
considered and scientifically informed legislation.  
At the same time, in continental Europe, the rise of statutory 
lawmaking went largely unchecked, as European governments did 
not have strong judicial review. In German states through the 
nineteenth century, the freedom of economic action was permanently 
under attack by the complicated system of state-protected guilds and 
occupational rights, and there was no basis in a constitutional 
judiciary parallel to that of the United States to challenge these 
provisions. The gradual rise of democracy did not result in the 
abolition of privileges and other regulations. On the contrary, in 
1878, the previous short-lived liberalization was reversed again and 
the legislation supporting the guilds was introduced and subsequently 
amended. By 1886, no fewer than 9,185 guilds existed in Germany 
(Dawson 1890). Bismarck instituted a number of welfare and 
regulatory reforms with clear parallels to the proposals that US courts 
were thwarting at about the same time. A number of social security 
statutes were introduced from the late 1870s onward, including 
compulsory sick-relief insurance, old age insurance, accident 
insurance, and working hour restrictions, as well as usury laws and a 
state monopoly on tobacco. It is difficult to imagine many of these 
regulations, nationalizations, compulsions, or special privileges 
passing strict judicial scrutiny under substantive due process. 
One contemporary parallel, still noticeable despite the waning of 
constitutional protection in the economic sphere in common law, is 
with antitrust law in Europe and the United States. Even though 
these two antitrust regimes share doctrinal and intellectual bases, 
antitrust law is noticeably more lenient in the United States than in 
Europe, including national competition policies and antimonopoly at 
the EU level. Only vaguely based on several general statutes, the 
definition of antitrust law in the United States has been mainly left to 
ordinary courts. The European antimonopoly, on the other hand, is 
largely based in the executive branch and led by experts in the 
discipline. At least for the proponents of free market economy, a 
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judiciary relying on a few crude heuristics appears to be a wiser 
adjudicator of competition disputes in the long term than expert 
executives are.  
A prominent counterexample of the judicial failure to use its 
ordinary rules and principles as heuristics and to engage in 
policymaking instead is the now famous case of Kelo v. New London 
(2005), in which the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a city 
government and against the protection of private property rights. In 
Kelo, the Supreme Court decided not to invalidate the city of New 
London’s decision to use eminent domain to transfer a property from 
one private party to another. After the city government proposed a 
policy initiative to boost local economic development, courts had a 
choice to either strictly stick to property rights protection and not try 
to second guess the consequences, or to allow the two other 
branches of government to do what they thought best for overall 
economic development—which, in this case, unprecedentedly 
included property takings in favor of other private parties for “public 
use.” The Supreme Court eventually chose the latter. In addition to 
the concession regarding the legitimacy of government property 
takings for economic development purposes, the Supreme Court’s 
majority opinion in Kelo implicitly assumed the epistemic superiority 
of policymakers and their unquestionable ability to determine what 
the best development policies are. 
However, subsequent developments turned out to favor the 
earlier constitutional principle. After eminent domain was used to 
transfer the property to the developer, the development plans never 
came into being and the site remains unused (McGeehan 2009). 
Undoubtedly, a number or events, from the decision backlash to the 
bursting of the real estate bubble and the financial crisis that ensued, 
may be invoked to explain the lack of subsequent development. But 
that such events may thwart the plan merely confirms that 
policymakers operate under the condition of radical ignorance, which 
drastically limits their ability to consciously direct economic 
development. Following the simple and imperfect property rights rule 
in the face of the conceivably superior ad hoc decision to condemn the 
property would have, in this case, been better aligned with the city’s 
own economic development goals. Like all heuristics, constitutional 
or rights-based heuristics used in policymaking decisions are 
imperfect, rough, and imprecise. But a skeptical view of purportedly 
rational policymaking and conscious institutional design makes such 
simple heuristics wise in comparison.  
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VII. Conclusion 
Alexander Hamilton (1787) famously wrote that the judiciary is, from 
the nature of its functions, the least dangerous branch of 
government. In the age of the dominance of statutory legislation, this 
view has an additional dimension. The constitutional judiciary has, 
through the twentieth century, become increasingly unpopular, and 
its legitimacy to participate in defining the rules of the game has 
never been weaker. Its defense, furthermore, has been limited to 
arguments such as constitutional protection of liberties, amounting to 
a silent admittance that deliberate policymaking is, by default, 
epistemically superior. Other defenses of common law, such as those 
addressing judicial independence or efficiency of legal rules, equally 
neglect the possibility proposed in this article: that judge-made law 
may in fact be epistemically superior to statutory and executive rule-
making.  
The gradual demise of judge-made law and the popularity of 
statutory law coincide with the rise of rationalism and an optimistic 
view of the possibility of expert policymaking. However, more recent 
findings from cognitive psychology, decision-making, and to some 
extent economics cast a different light on human rationality. 
Psychological evidence on the neglected wisdom contained in simple 
heuristics, accompanied by the Hayekian argument about the limits 
of expert policy knowledge, invokes skepticism of rational 
rulemaking while giving rise to the idea of a positive epistemic 
content of constitutional and judicial principles, and constitutionally 
based judge-made law in general. Market relationships are far too 
intricate for us to be able to design the rules that will steer them in 
predictable and desired directions, even if legislative and regulatory 
efforts are honest and well-intentioned. The recognition of the limits 
of conscious legislative design calls for a reconsideration of the 
predominantly critical view of the judiciary as an alternative rule-
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